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evils threaten the welfare of the children, the status quo 
at the time the appeal was taken will not be disturbed. 
[4] Neilma has requested costs and counsel fees incurred 
in this proceeding. As pointed out in Lerner v. Superior 
Court, ante, p. 676 [242 P.2d 321], the trial court has 
jurisdiction to award suit money in original proceedings in 
this court arising out of divorce actions in the trial court. 
The motion will be denied without prejudice to its renewal 
in the trial court. 
The petition for an order permitting the minor children 
to leave the state temporarily pending appeal is denied. The 
motion for counsel fees and costs is denied without prejudice. 
Gibson, C .• J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
.T., and Spence, J., concurred. 
The opinion was modified to read as above printed on April 
18,1952. 
[So F. No. 18262. In Bank. Mar. 27, 1952.] 
M. J. ORELLA, Appellant, V. MAY JOHNSON et a1., 
Respondents. 
[1] Trusts - Evidence to Establish. - Evidence of conversation 
which plaintiff had with his deceased wife, wherein she al-
legedly promised that if he would convey certain property to 
his stepdaughter, it would'be reconveyed to him on his request, 
is inadmissible to establish that stepdaughter agreed to hold 
property in trust for plaintiff in absence of proof that his 
wife was the stepdaughter's agent. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1870(5).) 
[2] Evidence-Res Gestae-Declarations During Transaction.-
Unless the statute of frauds is a bar to the establishment of 
It constructive trust, evidence of a conversation which plain-
tiff had with his decl'asl'd wife, wherein she allegedly prom-
ised that if he would coun'y certain property to his step-
daughter, it would he reconveyed to him on his request, is 
admiRsihle as part of the transaction in which plaintiff con-
veyed his property to his stepdaughter, and is relevant to 
prove both the reaRon for the conveyance and what plaintiff 
intendl'd to accomplish by it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1850.) 
[2J See Ca1.Jur., Evidenct', § 340; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 664. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 332(1) i [2] Evidence, § 282; 
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Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of 
Grantee.-Where grantor conveys property to another in reli-
anee on oral promise of latter to hold the property in trust for 
the grantor or a third pprson and the grnntee subsequently 
repudiates the trust, a eonstructive trust may be enforced 
against the grantee if the conveyance was induced by fraud 
or if there was a confidential relationship between the parties. 
(Civ. Code, § 2224.) 
Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Gran-
tee.-When grantee refuses to perform his oral promise to 
hold the property in trust for the grantor or a third persen, 
it is either actual fraud which induced the conveyance, or 
constructive fraud arising from a confidential relationship 
coupled with breach of the oral promise, which brings into 
operation the provisions of Civ. Code, § 2224, declaring that 
one who gains a thing by fraud is an involuntary trustee of 
the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would 
otherwise have had it. 
Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Gran-
tee.-Since under Civ. Code, § 2224, the trust is in favor of 
the person who, but for the fraud, "would otherwise have 
had" the property, the effect of its application when the 
grantee refuses to perform his oral promise, is to enforce the 
trust in favor of the intended beneficiary. 
Id.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Oral Agreement of Gran-
tee.-Although oral promise by grantee to reconvey property 
to grantor is unenforceable under statute of frauds, unjust· 
enrichment by grantee on his repudiation of such promise 
should be prevented by compelling him to make specific resti-
tution to the grantor upon evidence either that grantor con-
veyed his property in reliance on an oral prom'ise to reconvey 
it to him, or that the conveyance was induced by fraud. 
Id.-Constructive Trusts-Evidence.-Evidence that plaintiff's 
stepdaughter accepted and recorded a grant deed by which 
plaintiff and his wife, the stepdaughter's mother, conveyed to 
her the property on which they had been living; that she 
allowed her parents to continue to live on the property after 
the deed to her was executed; that despite her disapproval 
she provided the funds for their purchase of other property 
from the proceeds of property sold by them; and that she 
stated to plaintiff she could not see why he wanted to spend 
money in repairs of the property last purchased, "but it is 
[3] Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving rise to a trust, 
notes, 35 A.L.R. 280; 45 A.L.R. 851; 80 A.L.R. 195. See, also, 
Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 31 j Am.Jur.,~rusts, § 231. 
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your 1II01lf'Y, you can uo so," shows that she was acting as 
tl"llst('(' for plaintiff with respect to his real estate transac-
tions and supports un ill ference that she ratified the trans-
action undertaken on her behalf. 
APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Cruz County. James L. Atteridge, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to impress a trust on realty and for an accounting. 
Judgment of nonsuit reversed. 
Alfred J. Harwood for Appellant. 
J. Frank Murphy and Eugene J. Adams for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment 
for defendants entered after the granting of a motion for 
nonsuit. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff and disregarding conflicts, the evidence may be 
summarized as follows: 
In 1933 plaintiff received from his parents as his separate 
property a home known as the Harder Road place in Alameda 
County. At that time he borrowed $1,000 from defendant 
·May Johnson, his stepdaughter, to payoff a mortgage on 
the property. Plaintiff and his wife lived on the property, 
and in 1938 he and his wife executed a grant deed conveying 
it to May. In 1941 the property was sold for $3,900, which 
was paid to May, and the deed was executed by her. She 
retained the $1,000 plaintiff owed her and the $400 interest 
due thereon. One thousand eight hundred dollars of the 
$3,900 was used to purchase a new home for plaintiff and his 
wife, known as the Winton Road place. Title was taken in 
May's name. In 1943 the Winton Road property was sold for 
$4,500, and $2,300 of this amount was used to purchase prop-
erty in Santa Cruz. In December, 1947, plaintiff learned for 
the first time that title to the Santa Cruz property was in May's 
name. Shortly thereafter his wife died, and he asked May to 
convey the property to him. She refused and thereafter con-
veyed the property to herself and her daughter as joint ten-
ants. Plaintiff brought this action to impress a trust on the 
property and to obtain an accounting of the amounts May had 
realized through the sales of the Harder Road and Winton 
Road properties. Plaintiff sought to prove that the 1938 con-
veyance to defendant was intended as a deed of trust to secure 
his indebtedness to her and that she accepted the deed on 
) 
l38 C.2d 
the understanding that she would reconvey the property to 
him on his request. 
To prove the alleged oral trust plaintiff sought to introduce 
l'vidence of al conversation he had with his wife that resulted 
in his executing the deed to May. The trial court excluded 
this evidence on the ground that any statements made by 
plaintiff's wife would not be binding on May in the absence 
of proof that plaintiff's wife was acting as May's agent ill 
the transaction. Plaintiff then offered to prove that his 
wife stated to him: "Honey, I have got a proposition May 
wants me to put to you; she wants you to make a deed of 
trust of the property because she is afraid you will be in-
volved in an automobile accident and the people who are 
injured might come on the property .... " In response 
plaintiff said, "yes, with the understanding that any time 
he wanted the property back in his name May Johnson would 
deed it back to him." His wife then said, "Yes, that is 
okay." 
[1] In the absence of proof that plaintiff's wife was May's 
agent, the evidence of this conversation was inadmissible to 
establish that defendant agreed to hold the property in trust 
for plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(5).) [2] Unless, 
however, the statute of frauds is a bar to the establishment 
of a constructive trust in this case, this evidence was ad-
missible as part of the transaction in which plaintiff con-
veyed his property, and was relevant to prove both the 
reason for the conveyance and what plaintiff intended to 
accomplish by it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1850; Setkman v. Bul-
key, 9 Cal.2d 21, 24 [68 P.2d 961]; Simons v. Bedell, 122 
Cal. 341, 349-350 [55 P. 3, 68 Am.St.Rep. 35]; Airola v. 
Gorham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 50-52 [133 P.2d 78] ; Williamson 
v. Kinney, 52 Cal.App.2d 98, 103-104 [125 P.2d 920].) It 
is therefore necessary to consider the possible theories under 
which plaintiff might enforce a constructive trust against 
defendants in the light of the evidence presented. 
[3] If a grantor conveys property to another in reliance 
on the oral promise of the latter to hold the property in trust 
for the grantor or a third person and the grantee subse-
quently repudiates the trust, it is settled that a constructive 
trust may be enforced against the grantee if the conveyance 
was induced by fraud or if there was a confidential relation-
ship between the parties. (Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 
527-529 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189]; Odell v. Moss, 130 
Cal. 352, 358 [62 P. 555] ; Jones v. Jones, 140 Cal. 587, 590 
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[74 P. 143]; Lam'icella, Y. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 65-67 
[118 P. 430] jIll/bel' v. H1lber. 27 Ca1.2d 784, 790 [167 P.2d 
70S] ; sec Hest., Trusts, § 44.) Such trusts are enforced under 
thr provisions of seetion 2224 of the Civil Code that "One who 
g-aills a thillg b:' frand ... is ... an involuntary trustee 
(If thr thing" gailW(J, for the benefit of the person who would 
othrrwisl' haw had it." [4] It is either the actual fraud 
that i11clneed the ('Oll\·r.yaIWe, or tl](> constructive fraud aris-
ing fl'om the eOllfi(lential rellltionship coupled with the breach 
of thE' oral promise, that brings the provisions of the section 
into play. (B"isoll Y. Brisoll, supra; Laun:cella v. Lauricella, 
suprll; Robrrtsoll Y. SlIl1IllIcril, 39 Cal.4pp.2d 62, 65-66 [102 
P.2d 347 J.) [5] Since under this section the trust is in 
fllyor of thE' prrson who, but for the fraud, "would other-
,,-jsr haY(' ll/ld" thE' propert:', the effect of its application 
",11<'11 thE' gTantE'r refuses to perform his oral promise, is to 
I'lIffl1'eE' thl' trust ill favor of the intended beneficiaQ'. (Lall-
";('(7711 Y. Lallricr17a, slIpra; Cooney Y. Glynn, ]57 Cal. 583, 
;;S7 1108 P. 506] : srr S('(fr.~ v. R1I7e, 27 Ca1.2d 131, 139 [163 
P.2d 443J ; RE'st., Trnsts. § 45.) 
[6] '\Vhether 01' not there is a confidential relationship or 
whptl]('r or not the original transfer was induced b:' fraud, 
fllr fad remains that thE' In'ante? will bE' unjustl:- enriched, 
if Ilf' is allO\\'('(l 10 repndiatr his promise and retain tIle prop-
Pl'tr. A('eor<li11gl:-. tIl<' vir,,- lIas bpen forcefulI~' adyocated 
that althongh thp !!J'Hnter ea11not hr compelled to perform his 
prolllisp ill vir", of thf' statutE' of frauds, unjust enrichment 
shOll hi lw PI'pYrlltp(l h:' (,(lllllwlling' him to mak!' specific resti-
tntiol1 to thr grantor. (SE'r 1 Scott on Trusts. § 44, p. 248, 
all(l allthoritips ('iten.) This view is supported b:' the rule 
111nt a pnrehasrr 1I11(lpr an invalid oral contract to buy land 
nHl~' l'P('OYrr thr 111I1011nt hE' has paid if the seller refuses 
10 prrfor1l1 t ll(' eontra('t (see JJ O1'CSCO Y. Foppiano. 7 Cal.2d 
~~2. 2~7 [60 P.2(14::!01: Best., Restitution, ~ 108(d»), and thr 
1'1111' t hat a prl'son ,,-lio rf'nders sprviees under an invalid oral 
('OlJtl';wt to <1f'\'isE' proprrt:' may seenre qllfl11t1l111 meruit for 
til!' yallir of thosp sPl'Yjpes. (Zellncr Y. lVasslllon, 184 Cal. 80, 
RR I] fl:1 P. R41.) A lthOllg-h then> are cases where recover~' 
has hrE'1l <1(,11il'l1 drsllitp an appnrent unjnst enrichment (Barr 
Y. o 'DfllI IIrll, 'i() Cnl. 4fiD [18 P. 429, 9 Am.St.Rep. 242]; 
1'1'111('1/ Y. IlO"'lIl'd. 7n Cal. ;;2;) 121 P. 984. 12 Am.St.Rep. ]62. 
4 hlL\. 82(jl : s(,p. 1l1so. Babcock Y. Ghas(', 111 Cal. 351 r43 P. 
1l0.il: N1/8' Y . .lh7)/·I/,~. 1() Cal. 3;)0: r:ra)l Y. Walker. ]()7 Cal. 
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381 [108 P. 278] ), in none of them was the question raised or 
considered of the availability of the remedy of specific resti-
tution as distinct from the remedy of a constructive trust 
based on the abuse of a confidential relationship. In cases 
where the question has been considered, however, the right 
to relief has been recognized. (Steinberger v. Steinberger, 
60 Cal.App.2d 116, 120 [140 P.2d 31] ; Edwards v. Edwards, 
90 Cal.App.2d 33, 39 [202 P.2d 589] ; Adams v. Talbott, 61 
Cal.App.2d 315, 319 [142 P.2d 775] ; see, also, Sears v. Rule, 
27 Ca1.2d 131, 140 [163 P.2d 443] ; Taylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 
717,722 [127 P. 66] ; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 485-487.) 
Accordingly, it is unneces§ary to decide whether there was a 
confidential relationship in this case. The nonsuit must be 
reversed if there is evidence, either that plaintiff conveyed 
his property in reliance" on an oral promise to reconvey it to 
him, or that the conveyance was induced by fraud. 
[7] Although there is no evidence that May authorized 
her mother to solicit the conveyance, plaintiffs contends that 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that she rati-
fied the transaction undertaken in her behalf. In this respect 
the record shows that May accepted and recorded the deed. 
She allowed plaintiff and his wife to live on the Harder Road 
property after the deed to her was executed. She also al-
lowed them to live on the Winton Road property and the 
Santa Cruz property. She stated to her parents that she 
thought they were making a mistake in buying the Santa Cruz 
property, but nevertheless she provided the funds for its 
purchase from the proceeds of the sale of the Winton Road 
property. She stated to plaintiff that she did not see. why 
he wanted to spend money in repairs of the Santa Cruz 
property, "but it is your money, you can do so," and she 
supplied the funds for the repairs. 
This course of conduct is consistent with a recognition on 
May's part that she was acting as trustee for plaintiff with 
respect to his real estate transactions and the profits realized 
therefrom. From her cooperation in selling the Winton Road 
property and buying the SantaCruz property, despite her 
own disapproval, the trier of facts could reasonably infer an 
admission that the property was plaintiff's and not hers. 
Similarly her providing the money that she described as 
"your money," suggests that she acknowledged that she held 
the profits from the sale of the Winton Road property in 
trust for plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff also introduced evidence of a conversation between 
himself and May 's dall~hter at which May was present. This 
conversation took plaee after plaintiff's wife's death. Plaintiff 
asked the daughter what her mother intended to do with the 
property, and the daughter replied, "You know Ma is holding 
that property for you; that property is yours." 
The most compelling evidence in plaintiff's favor, how-
ever, either on the theory that May ratified her mother's 
arrangement with plaintiff or on the theory that the convey-
ance was procured by the mother's fraud, is the fact that May 
accepted and recorded the dee<l. When plaintiff's wife deliv-
ered plaintiff's deed to defendant, the latter was put on 
inquiry as to the purpose of the conveyance. (Phillips v. 
Phillips, 163 Cal. 530, 534-535 [127 P. 346] ; Ballard v. Nye, 
138 Cal. 588, 599 [72 P.156].) It may reasonably be inferred 
that her mother either informed her of the arrangement by 
which she secured the deed or fabricated a story with respect 
thereto. In the former case, May's acceptance of the deed 
with knowledge of the facts would constitute a ratification 
of the agency and make her mother's negotiations in her 
behalf binding upon her. (Civ. Code, § 1589; AiroZa v. Gor-
ham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 49 [133 P.2d 78] ; Moody v. Judah 
Boas Finance Corp., 93 Cal.App. 21, 25-26 [268 P. 974].) If, 
on the other hand, May neither authorized her mother to act 
in her behalf nor was informed by her mother of the arrange-
ments that were made with plaintiff, it is clear from plaintiff's 
offer of proof that he was induced to part with his property 
because of fraudulent representations made to him by his wife. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the jUdgment. 
